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Abstract—We explore means to advance source camera identi-
fication based on sensor noise in a data-driven framework. Our
focus is on improving the sensor pattern noise (SPN) extraction
from a single image at test time. Where existing works suppress
nuisance content with denoising filters that are largely agnostic
to the specific SPN signal of interest, we demonstrate that a deep
learning approach can yield a more suitable extractor that leads
to improved source attribution. A series of extensive experiments
on various public datasets confirms the feasibility of our approach
and its applicability to image manipulation localization and
video source attribution. A critical discussion of potential pitfalls
completes the text.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sensor noise fingerprints have been recognized and utilized
as a cornerstone of media forensics [1] ever since Luka´sˇ et
al. first observed almost 15 years ago in their seminal work
[2] that digital images can be traced back to their sensor
based on unique noise characteristics. Minute manufacturing
imperfections are believed to make every sensor physically
unique, leading to the presence of a weak yet deterministic
sensor pattern noise (SPN) in each and every image signal
captured by the same sensor [3]. This fingerprint, commonly
referred to as photo-response non-uniformity (PRNU), can
be estimated from images captured by a specific camera for
the purpose of source camera identification, in which a noise
signal extracted from a probe image of unknown provenance
is compared against pre-computed fingerprint estimates from a
set of candidate cameras.
While extensive testing has already demonstrated the feasi-
bility of highly reliable PRNU-based consumer camera identi-
fication at scale [4], recent research has been largely driven
by enabling source attribution under ever more challenging
conditions. Modern cameras, particularly those installed in
smartphones, go to great lengths to produce visually appealing
imagery, and techniques such as lens distortion correction,
electronic image stabilization, or high dynamic range imaging
have all been found to impede camera identification if not
accounted for through spatial resynchronization [5]–[7]. Ro-
bustness to strong image and video compression is another
major concern [8]–[10] that has been gaining more and more
practical relevance due the widespread sharing of visual media
through online social networks [11]. Finally, the ability to
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reliably establish camera identification also from very small
image patches is crucial for image manipulation localization
based on sensor noise [12]–[14].
The pertinent literature concludes that all these scenarios
generally benefit from high-quality fingerprint estimates, and
that images should undergo content suppression prior to
analysis [3]. To date, most works still resort to the Wavelet-
based denoiser as adopted by Luka´sˇ et al. [15] for that purpose.
The maximum likelihood fingerprint estimator derived from a
simplified multiplicative signal model [12] gives near-optimal
results when fed with noise residuals from a set of full-
resolution images of a homogeneously lit scene. The conditions
at test time are less ideal, however. Probe images are generally
of varying content and an aggregation over multiple images is
often not possible. It is accepted that noise residuals obtained
from off-the-shelf denoisers are imperfect by nature and that
they are contaminated non-trivially by remnants of image
content. Salient textures or quantization noise exacerbate the
issue. A number of studies have found that alternative denoising
algorithms can lead to moderate improvements [13], [16], [17],
yet there remains a considerable gap in the ability to reliably
establish the presence of the camera fingerprint in (portions
of) a probe image under more challenging conditions.
While the overall performance of camera identification is
clearly governed by fundamental bounds imposed by, for
instance, the available image resolution and the strength of
compression, this paper sets out to demonstrate that there
is still ample room for advances over prior art. Critically,
the present work deviates from the common procedure to
employ at test time the very same noise extractor that was
also used for fingerprint estimation, which we explain with
a subtle shift in perspective in the restatement of practical
camera identification: we accept that the goal ultimately is to
match a noise signal extracted from the probe image against
a pre-computed fingerprint estimate, and that the quality of
the match is assessed in terms of the similarity of the two
signals. Adopting the DnCNN work by Zhang et al. [18],
we let a convolutional neural network (CNN) learn how to
extract a noise signal from a probe image that resembles the
pre-computed sensor pattern noise (SPN) fingerprint from
the camera of interest as closely as possible. By looking
at fingerprint extraction through the lens of an optimization
procedure, the resulting network, which we call SPN-CNN, can
be expected to better adapt to the problem at hand than existing
fingerprint-agnostic denoising algorithms. It is worth pointing
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out here that the proposed technique differs from the creative
advancement of the DnCNN idea in Cozzolino and Verdoliva’s
NoisePrint approach [19] both in its objective and its design
in that the computed noise signal is expected to emphasize
device characteristics instead of camera model characteristics
through a training regime that explicitly utilizes a known
camera-specific target signal (the camera fingerprint estimate)
instead of a more general notion of pairwise patch similarity.
Another related work is the image anonymization approach
by Bonettini et al. [20], who adapted a DnCNN-like design
to remove the camera fingerprint from an image. We refer to
Section III for a more detailed exposition of our approach,
which follows after a brief overview of camera sensor noise
forensics in Section II. Section IV presents experimental results,
including applications to image manipulation localization and
video source identification. Section V concludes the text.
II. CAMERA SENSOR NOISE FORENSICS
State-of-the-art sensor noise forensics assumes a simplified
imaging model of the form
x = x(o)(1 + k) + θ , (1)
in which the multiplicative PRNU factor k modulates the noise-
free image x(o), while θ comprises a variety of additive noise
components [3]. Substantial empirical evidence suggests that
the PRNU is a unique and robust camera fingerprint [4] that
can be estimated from a set of N images taken with the specific
camera of interest. The standard procedure relies on a denoising
filter F (·) to obtain the noise residual wn = xn−F (xn) from
the n-th image xn, 1 ≤ n ≤ N . A modeling assumption
wn = kxn + ηn (2)
with i. i. d. Gaussian noise ηn then leads to a maximum
likelihood estimate kˆ of the PRNU factor of the form [12]
kˆ =
(
N∑
n=1
wnxn
)
·
(
N∑
n=1
x2n
)−1
. (3)
Practical applications warrant a post-processing step to clean
the fingerprint estimate from non-unique artifacts [3], [21].
For a given probe image y of unknown provenance, camera
identification is formulated as a hypothesis testing problem:
H0 : w = y − F (y) does not contain the fingerprint k
H1 : w does contain the fingerprint k ;
i. e., the probe is attributed to the tested camera if H1 holds.
In practice, the test can be decided by evaluating the similarity
between the residual w and the fingerprint estimate kˆ for a
suitably set threshold τ ,
ρ = sim(w, kˆ)
H1
≷
H0
τ . (4)
It is assumed that the two signals are geometrically aligned
except for possible translational displacements, which can be
accounted for conveniently with normalized cross-correlation
or peak-to-correlation energy (PCE) as similarity measures [3].
As inserting content from elsewhere into an image or
other forms of image manipulation will remove or impair
the camera fingerprint in the affected regions, many local
image alterations can be detected by testing for the presence of
the expected fingerprint in a sliding window mode [12]. The
localization of small manipulated regions warrants sufficiently
small analysis windows, which generally impacts the ability
to reliably establish whether or not the expected fingerprint is
present negatively. The literature often recommends a window
size of about 64× 64 pixels as a reasonable trade-off between
resolution and accuracy [13], [14], [22]. A core problem is that
the measured local similarity scores under H1 depend greatly
on local image characteristics. Chen et al. [12] have proposed
a correlation predictor ρˆi(x) as a remedy, which utilizes a set
of simple intensity and texture features to predict how strongly
the i-th local patch in a probe image would correlate with the
purported camera fingerprint under H1. The decision whether
to declare a manipulation (i. e., the absence of the expected
fingerprint) can then be made based on the deviation from the
expected correlation.
As for video data, it can be advantageous to estimate
reference sensor fingerprints from full-resolution still images
when available [23]. At test time, it is usually recommended
to aggregate noise residuals from multiple probe frames into
a probe video fingerprint to cope with strong compression
artifacts [24]. Special care has to be taken to account for
geometrical desynchronization due to video stabilization, as
pointed out in many recent reports [6], [23], [25].
III. SPN-CNN ESTIMATOR
While camera source attribution from sensor pattern noise
arguably works extremely well iff pitfalls due to geometric
misalignment between the fingerprint and the probe are avoided,
there remains a huge discrepancy between a fingerprint estimate
aggregated from several images, kˆ, and an estimate from a
single probe image (via the residual w). A simple explana-
tion is that denoising algorithms are not designed with this
specific application in mind, and more generally that content
suppression is an ill-posed problem in the absence of viable
image models (and possibly even of the noise characteristics
itself [26]). Thanks to the central limit theorem, aggregation
over multiple noise residuals mitigates these effects to some
extent, but noise residuals from a single image will always
suffer from significant distortion.
The recent success of data-driven methods suggests a way
forward, however, especially also considering that Equation (4)
poses a clear objective function to be targeted. By understand-
ing CNNs as flexible non-linear optimization tool, it seems
reasonable to expect that a network should be able to learn how
to extract a better approximation of k from a given probe than
a conventional “blind” denoiser. Conceptually, the problem at
hand aligns with the scenario considered by Zhang et al. [18],
who trained a CNN to learn how to extract well-characterized
noise signals from a given image. In our case, we train a
network to extract a noise pattern k˜ to minimize ‖kˆ − k˜‖22.
Our premise here is that the maximum likelihood fingerprint
N flat-field images N noise residuals fingerprint estimate kˆ
training image fingerprint estimate k˜
MLEF (·)
SPN-CNN L = ‖kˆ− k˜‖
update
Fig. 1. Proposed SPN-CNN training for learning to extract a camera fingerprint
k˜ from a given probe image.
estimator (MLE) gives the best approximation of the actual
PRNU signal that we have under the given imaging model
assumptions, so we consider it a viable proxy target in lieu of
the unknown ground truth. Once trained, the network replaces
the denoiser F (·) at test time, i. e., w = k˜ in Equation (4).
Notably, this breaks with the tradition of employing the very
same denoiser for both fingerprint estimation and detection,
although further iterations in which the trained network informs
a better fingerprint aggregation seem conceivable.
Figure 1 outlines the overall training setup, which operates,
in its current instantiation, on single-channel grayscale patches
of size 40×40 pixels. To facilitate the learning, the output from
each training patch is paired with its corresponding portion of
the fingerprint estimate kˆ. The SPN-CNN itself is modeled after
Zhang et al.’s DnCNN [18] and comprises 17 layers. Each layer
implements 64 convolutional filters with a small 3× 3 spatial
support, except for the last layer with only a single-channel
output. Batch normalization is implemented in between the
convolutional layers, and ReLu activation follows after each
but the last layer. No pooling is used at any point. In line
with reports in the literature, any modern off-the-shelf denoiser
F (·) can be expected to do reasonably well for the purpose
of estimating a camera fingerprint from flat-field images. We
decided to stick with the standard Wavelet formulation [15] in
this work for its computational edge over alternative approaches.
The trained network can be fed with inputs of any size within
the memory constraints of the GPU. In practice, we divide
images into tiles of size 400×400 with an overlap of 20 pixels
to accommodate for possible boundary effects.
Figure 2 depicts exemplary results from two images from the
VISION database [27] and compares the obtained noise signals,
k˜, to the corresponding residuals from the Wavelet denoiser, w.
Although the CNN-based estimator does arguably not succeed
in suppressing the image content completely, the results suggest
qualitatively that it does better than the Wavelet denoiser. A
notable increase in correlation with the corresponding portion
of the camera fingerprint estimate kˆ supports this impression.
IV. EXPERIMENTS
We work with various datasets for an experimental validation.
Our baseline camera identification results in Section IV-B
probe k˜ (SPN-CNN) w (Wavelet)
0.0966 0.0655
0.0901 0.0591
Fig. 2. Two 400× 400 images and the noise signals obtained with the SPN-
CNN and Wavelet estimators. Each noise pattern has been scaled independently
to cover the full intensity range. Numbers in the lower left corner indicate the
correlation with the corresponding Wavelet-based camera fingerprint.
cover camera fingerprints from ten devices from the VISION
Database [27], and from six cameras from the Dresden Image
Database [28], respectively. The former dataset comprises
camera-native JPG images from a variety of mobile devices,
whereas we chose the Nikon cameras that provide uncom-
pressed imagery from the latter (converted from raw format
with Adobe Lightroom). For each camera, we reserve 100
randomly chosen images for training and divide the remaining
images into non-overlapping crops of size 400 × 400 pixels,
resulting in a total of 53,677 (VISION) plus 41,568 (Dresden)
cropped test images under H1. Under H0, we supply for each
non-overlapping 400×400 portion of the 16 camera fingerprints
about 100 randomly chosen image crops from a different device,
totaling in 48,362 (VISION) plus 23,004 (Dresden) samples.
The manipulation localization results in Section IV-C cover
the 55 manipulated images from the Nikon D7000 camera
in the Realistic Tampering Dataset [14]. These uncompressed
images originate from the RAISE database [29], from which
we source an additional 100 images for training. To gain some
insight into the applicability to video source attribution in
Section IV-D, we work with 18 camera-native indoor and
outdoor videos from a Samsung Galaxy S3 Mini (D01 in the
VISION database), where we reserve five videos for training.
All databases provide flat-field images for the initial MLE
camera fingerprint estimation with the Wavelet denoiser.
A. Training
We train a separate network for each camera fingerprint of
interest in batches of size 128 for 100 epochs. Each epoch
sees a selection of non-overlapping 40× 40 patches from all
training images. The patch selection is greedy and successively
samples up to 1,000 random patches per image while rejecting
those that overlap with previous selections from within the
same image. The final number of selected patches thus depends
on the image size, but it typically averages to over 50,000 per
TABLE I
MEDIAN CORRELATION UNDER H1 (400× 400 PATCHES, VISION).
SPN-CNN trained for camera
ca
m
er
a extractor
D01 D02 D03 D06 D10 D15 D26 D27 D29 D34 Wav [18]
D01 0.075 0.058 0.046 0.055 0.062 0.053 0.072 0.058 0.061 0.063 0.055 0.054
D02 0.070 0.082 0.051 0.065 0.072 0.073 0.072 0.071 0.072 0.073 0.064 0.060
D03 0.020 0.020 0.045 0.027 0.028 0.032 0.019 0.030 0.029 0.027 0.024 0.019
D06 0.058 0.054 0.054 0.092 0.061 0.068 0.058 0.064 0.062 0.079 0.051 0.051
D10 0.065 0.057 0.044 0.052 0.082 0.051 0.059 0.056 0.061 0.059 0.056 0.051
D15 0.073 0.070 0.074 0.087 0.076 0.116 0.071 0.081 0.086 0.081 0.065 0.060
D26 0.062 0.045 0.038 0.048 0.053 0.046 0.067 0.054 0.051 0.055 0.045 0.047
D27 0.064 0.061 0.057 0.061 0.065 0.061 0.065 0.083 0.069 0.064 0.071 0.069
D29 0.052 0.048 0.045 0.047 0.052 0.054 0.048 0.055 0.064 0.052 0.053 0.048
D34 0.061 0.054 0.042 0.066 0.057 0.054 0.058 0.057 0.060 0.081 0.049 0.046
epoch. Saturated patches are excluded from training. We use
the Adam optimizer with MSE loss for training with learning
rate 10−3 and weight decay of 0.2 after every 30 epochs.
B. Baseline Results
For a test of the proposed noise extractor’s baseline perfor-
mance, we conduct basic camera identification by correlating
the obtained noise signals against the corresponding matching
camera fingerprint estimate. A key question is whether each
camera fingerprint warrants its own set of learned parameters.
Table I gives some insight by reporting the median correlation
scores under H1 for the VISION database, where we employed
all ten trained networks (arranged along the columns) for
each probe image. For comparison, the last two columns list
the corresponding results obtained from the standard Wavelet
denoiser (Wav), and an off-the-shelf variant of the DnCNN [18]
that we trained to extract Gaussian noise with standard deviation
σ = 3 on the 400 images provided by its authors. Notably,
the SPN-CNN approach yields a measurable boost over the
fingerprint-agnostic techniques when a camera-specific variant
of the network is employed. The median correlation under H1
increases, on average, by a factor of 1.5 (at a median correlation
under H0 of about 10−4 compared to 10−5 for the Wavelet
denoiser), while camera-foreign network configurations yield
H1 correlations that are largely on par with prior art. The
corresponding results for the six cameras from the Dresden
Image Database in Table II give a slightly different picture, as
the network training seems to have less influence. It is currently
unclear to what extent this is an artifact of the much more
homogenous dataset (where each camera was set up to capture
the same scenes [28] and all images were processed with the
same Adobe software). Images in the VISION dataset are more
heterogenous, both in terms of content and camera-specific
processing pipelines.1 More tailored datasets and experiments
will be necessary to disentangle the impact of training data and
sensor specifics. For the time being, we recommend training a
camera-specific network for each fingerprint.
Adopting this premise, Figure 3 gives a more comprehensive
picture of camera identification performance by reporting ROC
curves for a select set of ten cameras from both datasets.
We focus on smaller patches of size 100× 100 and 50× 50
1For instance, both device D06 and D15 are iPhone 6 cameras, but operate
under different iOS versions.
TABLE II
MEDIAN CORRELATION UNDER H1 (400× 400 PATCHES, DRESDEN).
SPN-CNN trained for camera
ca
m
er
a extractor
D200-0 D200-1 D70-0 D70-1 D70s-0 D70s-1 Wav [18]
D200-0 0.071 0.071 0.067 0.066 0.069 0.068 0.048 0.048
D200-1 0.087 0.089 0.084 0.083 0.086 0.084 0.059 0.060
D70-0 0.083 0.084 0.088 0.087 0.087 0.086 0.053 0.052
D70-1 0.081 0.082 0.086 0.086 0.086 0.084 0.050 0.050
D70s-0 0.094 0.095 0.098 0.096 0.098 0.096 0.059 0.059
D70s-1 0.066 0.066 0.067 0.066 0.068 0.068 0.040 0.040
here (center-cropped from the bigger probes) to showcase
the advantage of the targeted data-driven extractors over
conventional methods. Not surprisingly, smaller patch sizes
incur a drop in performance, but the proposed approach
achieves notable improvements across all tested cameras,
including those not depicted here.
C. Application: Manipulation Localization
The promising performance on camera identification from
small image patches suggests improved image manipulation
localization. We test this conjecture by computing from
the aforementioned 55 manipulated images 64 × 64 sliding
window correlations with the Nikon D7000 fingerprint estimate.
Following prior art [12], we also train a simple linear regression
correlation predictor for both the SPN-CNN and the Wavelet
noise extractors. A completely disjoint set of 20,000 patches
from 20 images was used for this purpose. The pixel-level
ROC curves (aggregated over all probe images) in the left
panel of Figure 4 are obtained from thresholding the difference
between measured and predicted correlation, ∆i = ρi − ρˆi,
i. e., a strongly negative difference is indicative of the camera
fingerprint being absent in the respective local neighborhood.
In line with the baseline results in Figure 3, the graphs suggest
that the data-driven SPN-CNN extractor is beneficial over the
standard Wavelet approach by a large margin. The overall
area under the curve (AUC) increases from 0.75 to 0.82. As
the results generally vary greatly from image to image, we
include a scatter plot of per-image pixel-level AUC scores in
the right panel of Figure 4. Observe that SPN-CNN performs
better for all but seven probe images, which qualitatively
seemed to exhibit content characteristics that were under-
represented during training. In general, it is worth pointing out
that the localization performance can be expected to increase
further with one of the more sophisticated recent random field
approaches [13], [14], [22].
D. Application: Video Source Attribution
Video source attribution is generally more challenging than
camera identification from still images. The final experiment of
this initial exploration thus puts emphasis on the impact of lossy
video compression and reduced resolution. We do not consider
video stabilization here to keep the discussion focussed, but
we anticipate that any performance boost in the absence of
stabilization would ultimately also help techniques designed to
reverse the effects of inter-frame geometric misalignment [6].
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Fig. 3. Camera identification baseline ROC performance for selected cameras from the VISION Database (top) and the Dresden Image Database (bottom)
based on the correlation between Wavelet-based camera fingerprint MLE and noise signals extracted from probe patches of size 100× 100 (blue) and 50× 50
(orange) w th SPN-CNN, and off-the-shelf Wavelet and DnCNN [18] denoising, res ctively.
To address the specific characteristics of video data, we train
a separate network on frames extracted from the five training
videos, while the target fingerprint was computed from the
available still images [23]. As a result, synchronizing the
imagery to the camera fingerprint requires special attention.
The available videos have a resolution of 1280× 720, whereas
the full sensor resolution of the still images is 2560 × 1920
pixels. We use the guidance in [27] to determine the geometric
mapping from image to video space, but found that the cropping
parameters had to be adjusted to reflect d ff ren s between
landscape and portrait mode. Once camera fingerprint estimate
and video frames are aligned, the training proceeds as before.
The results in Figure 5 offer two complementary perspectives.
The left anel reflects the common procedure to ggregate noise
estimates from multiple frames into a video fingerprint. The
graphs depict the mean CE score (averaged over all test videos)
against the number of frames considered (starting from the first
frame). The data-driven SPN-CNN approach again provides
a measurable boost over the Wavelet denoiser, indicating
the possibility of more reliable video source attribution. For
a closer look at video-specific results, the right panel of
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Fig. 4. Image manipulation localization pixel-level ROC curves from 55
manipulated images (left) and per-image AUC scores (right) from correlating
noise signals extracted with SPN-CNN and Wavelet denoising in sliding
windows of size 64×64 with the Wavelet-based camera fingerprint MLE.
Figure 5 reports average frame-level PCE scores per video,
distinguishing between I-frames and all remaining frames.2
I-frames are expectedly more beneficial for source attribution,
and noise signals extracted with the SPN-CNN resemble the
camera fingerprint more closely. The average frame-level PCE
over all I-frames increases from 75 to 135.
Interestingly, there is a sharp drop in SPN-CNN performance
for the last four videos compared to a more graceful decline of
the Wavelet approach. A closer inspection revealed that these
are all “outdoor” videos (each two from the “move” and “panrot”
categories), with content that was not well represented during
training. Along with a number of the earlier observations,
we thus find it appropriate to close with a note of caution.
While a data-driven perspective clearly holds great promise for
boosting sensor noise forensics under challenging conditions,
these advances may not come cheap in practice. Proper and
careful training is crucial, and a single “catch-all” framework
will likely require substantial further experimentation.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have demonstrated that digital camera identification from
PRNU sensor pattern noise can benefit greatly from training a
convolutional neural network to extract noise signals from probe
images that resemble the expected camera fingerprint more
closely than noise residuals obtained with standard fingerprint-
agnostic denoising procedures. The discussed network features
a clean end-to-end design that draws from the recent DnCNN
residual learning approach [18]. In its current instantiation,
it achieves its most favorable results with a dedicated set
of parameters for each candidate camera fingerprint, but
future research questions abound. More research is needed
to understand to what extent the apparent dependence on
sensor-specifics is related to differences in the content of
the data presented to the network. Along those lines, it is
2The training did not make this distinction.
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Fig. 5. Video source attribution from the first N probe video frames (left)
and from individual frames (right). Average PCE scores from 13 unstabilized
videos (left) and per video (right).
worth pointing out that we have not explicitly controlled
for effects such as JPEG compression quality etc., and that
practical applications may warrant a rigorous in-depth analysis
of the estimators under H0. Looking forward, it seems also
reasonable to assume that the current approach may only be a
stepping stone towards a fully data-driven camera identification
framework. Fingerprint estimation and noise signal extraction
may be learned jointly, likely leading to further performance
boosts. This may address some of the recent concerns regard
the viability of the fundamental imaging model that is also
the foundation of this present work [26]. Finally, questions
pertaining to fingerprint-copy and removal attacks in the realm
of counter-forensics [30] will also have to be reconsidered
when moving to data-driven approaches [20].
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